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Abstract: A number of technology products display positive network effects, and are used in 
variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include operating systems, infrastruc- 
ture and back-end software, web services and networking equipment. This paper studies optimal 
nonlinear pricing for such products, under incomplete information, and with the threat of compet- 
itivc entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions under 
which a fulfilled-expectatim contract exists and is unique are established. While network effects 
generally raise price, i t  is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the nature 
of the network effects - in some cnscs, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usage 
across customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants. 
Optimal pricing is shown to include quantity discounts that increase with usage, and may also in- 
volve a nonlinear two-part tariff. These results highlight the impact of network effects on trade-offs 
between price discrimination and value creation, and have important managerial implications for 
pricing policy in technology markets. 
The need to deter competitive entry generally lowers profits for the monopolist, and increases 
customer surplus. When network effects are homogeneous across customers, the resulting entry- 
deterring monopoly contract is a fixed fee and results in the socially optimal outcome. However, 
when the magnitude of heterogeneous network effects is relatively high, there are no changes in 
total surplus induced by the entry threat, and the price changes merely cause a transfer of value 
from the seller to its customers. The presence of net.work effects, and of a credible entry threat, are 
also shown to increase distributional efficiency by reducing tho disparity in relative value captured 
by different customer types. Regulatory and policy implications of these results are discussed. 
'I thank Nicholas Economides, Ravi Mantena and especially Roy Radner for helpful discussions, and seminar 
participants at New York University for feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. All responsibility for errors, 
omissions and gratuitous u e  of Greek symbols remains mine. 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes technology industries in which products displays positive network effects, and 
individual consumption varies across heterogeneous customers. The principal goals of the paper 
are to characterize the optimal nonlinear pricing schedules under incomplete information, and to 
study the resulting consumption patterns, profits and welfare, for different kinds of network effects, 
and under the potential threat of competitive entry. 
Standard economic theories of products that display network effects (henceforth termed network 
goods) typically assume that each customer purchases a maximum of one unit of the product, that 
the value of the network effect is proportionate t,o the total size of the product's eventual user base, 
and that all customer bencfit cqually from the network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Farrell 
and Saloner, 1985). However, there are a number of technology products which are consumed in 
variable quantities by different customers, and for which the magnitude of the network effects may 
depend on the total quantity consumed across customers, rather than simply the total number of 
adopters. In addition, the value each customer gets from the network effects may depend on their 
individual consumption, which in turn depends on the intrinsic value they place on the product. 
Extending the standard theory to incorporate these observations may have important implications 
for companies seeking to design optimal pricing policy for their network goods, as well as for the 
regulatory analysis of industries with network effects. 
The relevance of these obseservations can be illustrated through a few common examples of 
technology products that display network effects. Consider, for instance, the purchase of PC 
operating systems software by corporate customers. The simplest pricing problem faced by a seller 
in this market is one of choosing a pricing schedule, where quantity is measured by number of user 
licenses, and each corporate cktomer purchases a variable quantity of licenses. The network effects 
are caused largely by the higher availability and quality of complementary goods (applications 
software, compatible accessories) as the total number of OS installations increases. Consequently, 
the ma.gnit,llrln of the network effects are proportionate to the total number of licenses sold (the 
gross consumption), rather than simply the number of corporations who adopt the 0s. Moreover, 
a corporation which has a higher number of licenses benefits more from the increased quality and 
availability of the complementary g o o d s  in other words, the value realized from the network effects 
also depends on individual consumption, and may therefore be heterogeneous across corporations2, 
'In addition, there is a positive externality driven by value from intemperability, which is far more important 
within an organization than acmss companies, and is therefore influenced more by mindindual consumption. 
A similar argument can be made for back-end or enterprise software used in variable quantities 
by different companies (Oracle's datahme software and Siehel's CRM snlr~t.ion being two examples), 
or for networking equipment like routers and switches. In these cases, network effects are driven 
by the ease with which one can find qualified support or administration engineers, trained employ- 
ees, compatible software, or compatible equipment3. Network goods sold directly to individuals 
consumers may also display the same properties. For example, electronic marketplaces like eBay 
are widely recognized as displaying positive network effects, which stem from increrised liquidity, as 
well as a wider availability of robust systems supporting marketplace services (reputation, escrow, 
payment, settlement, dispute resolution). The magnitude of the network effects increases not just 
with the number of participants in the market, but with the extent to which each participant ac- 
tually buys and sells; moreover, an individual who participates more realizes higher benefits from 
them. Even for products used as canonical examples of network goods, such as telephone service, 
usage varies across consumers, network effects dependent on total consumption as well as installed 
base, users with higher consumption levels benefit more from the network effects, and pricing is 
often nonlinear. 
The ubiquity of variable consumption and heterogenous value from network goods in technology 
industries underlines the importance of a robust theoretical analysis that incorporates these prop 
erties. This paper providw such an analysis, characterizing the optimal nonlinear pricing schedule 
for a monopolist selling a network good, in a general model which explicitly captures the properties 
highlighted in the examples above. Two cases are analyzed successively. First, network effects 
whose magnitude depends on gross realized consumption (and are homogeneous across customers) 
are studied. Subsequently, network effects whose magnitude is heterogeneous across customers (by 
virtue of depending on both gross consumption and individual consumption) are modeled. The 
changes in consumption induced by the network effects are shown to vary significantly across the 
cases. There are also interesting variations in the manner in which the value generated by the net- 
work effects is distributed across the different customers. Moreover, while there are progressively 
steeper quantity diwou~lts as i~~dividual c v ~ ~ s u ~ ~ ~ p t i v ~ l  i~lcreases in both cases, optimal prici~~g i11 
the latter case may involve a two-part tariff. 
In addition to pure monopoly pricing, this paper also analyzes pricing by an entry-deterring 
monopolist. Many markets for technology goods feature dominant sellers with market power, and 
3While open networking standards do f o m  the basis for most networking equipment, many vendors Like Cisco 
Systems use proprietary operating system. Moreover, the ease of intemperability between equipment from competing 
vendors varies widely. 
there has been substantial recent interest in whether (and how) the potential thmat of entry affects 
their pricing choices. For instance, in the recent U.S. versus Microsoft case, both parties agreed 
that Microsoft's pricing was not consistent with monopoly profit maximization, and Schmalensee 
(1999) argued that Microsoft undcrpriccs in order to reduce the desirability of entry by competing 
firms into the market for operating systems. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) develop a formal model 
of limit pricing that supports this argument, in which installed base plays an entry-deterring role 
analogous to that of excess capacity (Spence, 1977, Dixit, 1980). 
This paper proposes and analyzes an alternate representation, in which to successfully deter 
a threat of entry, the monopolist must provide each customer with surplus equal to at  least the 
maximum intrinsic value they could get from a competing product. This limits the price each 
customer pays under the monopolist's nonlinear pricing schedule to being no more than the value 
they get from the network effects of the monopolist's product. As a consequence, network value 
may play the role of being the primary source of profits for a monopolist who prices to successfully 
deter entry. On the face of it, this has promising welfare implications, since one would expect a 
threat of entry to induce a substantial increase in consumption. Surprisingly, it is shown that there 
are sometimes no consumption changes (despite price reductions), and that when there are, the 
consumption increases are confined largely to a lower subset of types. However, entry deterrence 
is shown to even nut the relative distribution of surplus across different customer types. 
This paper draws from and adds to many lines of research. The first is the literature on monopoly 
pricing of technology products with positive network externalities. Related papers with monopoly 
models include Rohlfs (1974), Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982), Connors and Rummelt (1991), 
Riggins, Kreibel and Mukhopadhyay (1994), Wang and Seidmann (1995), Economides (1996a), and 
Cabral, Salant and Woroch (1999). Modeling network goods for which the network effects depend on 
gross consumption (rather than the number of adopters) is new, as is the analysis of hetcrogcncity in 
the value of the network effects across customers. The concept of fulfilled-expectations equilibrium4 
is extended to the case of customers purchasing variable quantities in a monopoly market. A related 
area of research is the literature on ~no~lopoly will1 nquliwe cunsurnrptiur~ externalities, specifically in 
the context of congestion in queuing and service systems (Mendelson, 1985, Dewan and Mendelson, 
1990, Mendelson and Whang, 1990, Westland, 1992, Gupta et al., 2000, Afeche and Mendelson, 
2001). 
4This is a widely used concept in modeling network effects, which is based on one notion of rational-expectations 
equilibrium under uncertainty (Radner, 1982), and was introduced into the network externalities literature by Katz 
and Shapim (1985) in the context of Cournot competition 
The second line of research this paper adds to is the literature on price screening in technology 
markets. Models developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984) and Wilson (1993) 
have been adapted and applied to problems unique to technology markets, by Nault (1997), Jones 
and Mendelson (1998), Bhargava and Choudhary (2001), Bhargava and Sundaresan (2002), Jing 
(2002), Sundararajan (2002), and Hosanagar et al. (2003), among others. The paper contributes 
new results to the theory by characterizing how positive network effects of different kinds affect 
optimal nonlinear pricing, and by establishing conditions under which optimal nonlinear pricing 
schedules that satisfy fulfilled-expectations exist and are unique. It complements recent work by 
Segal and Whinston (2001), and by Jullien (2001), that examine different problems of optimal 
contracting in the presence of network externalities. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the basic model, defines the 
solution concept, and characterizes the model's description of entry deterrence. Section 3 presents 
the analysis of the monopoly with homogeneous network effects, and Section 4 analyzes the case 
of heterogeneous network effects. Both sections 3 and 4 examine pricing and consumption changes 
induced by network effects, examine some welfare properties, establish how nonlinear pricing is 
affected by the threat of entry, and conclude with a simple example that illustrates the nature 
of the optimal pricing schedule and surplus distribution. Section 5 discusses the results further, 
discusses the model's assumptions, and concludes with an outline of open research questions raised. 
2. Model 
2.1. Firm and customers 
A monopolist sells a homogeneous product which may be used by consumers in varying quantities. 
The variable costs of production are assumed to be zero (though Section 5.2 describes how the 
model's results are robust to relaxing this assumption). Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by 
their type 8 E [@,8]. The monopolist does not observe the type of any customer, but knows F(0), 
the probability distribution of types in the customer population. F(0) is assumed to be strictly 
increasing and absolutely continuous, and therefore the corresponding density function f (8) exists 
and is strictly positive for all 0 E [@,8]. In addition, w, the reciprocal of the hazard rate, is 
assumed to be non-increasing for all 0. Each customer knows their own type 8. The total number 
of customers in the market is normalized to I .  
The preferences of a customer of type 8 are represented by the linearly separable utility function 
where q is the quantity of the product used by the customer (often referred to a3 indiiirlual wn- 
sumption), Q is the total quantity of the product used by all customers in the market (often referred 
to as the gross consumption) and p is the total price paid by the customer. W(q, 8, Q) is often 
referred to as the value function. 
The value function when Q = 0 is denoted U(q, 8), and is referred to as the intrinsic valve from 
the network good for customer type 8. That is: 
for all q,B. At any pasitivc Q, the expression [W(q,O,Q) - U(q,B)] is referred to as the network 
value from the network good for customer type 8. 
The value function W(q, 0,Q) is assumed to have the following properties: 
4. P(8, Q) = argmax W(q, 0, Q) is finite and unique for all 8. Wl(q,B, Q) > 0 for q < P(8, Q), 
4 
and W~(q,o, Q) < 0 for q > P(0, Q). 
Numbered subscripts to functions denote partial derivatives with respect to the correspundi~lg 
variable. The first set of properties - strict concavity in q, increasing value with type, and increasing 
marginal value with type (the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition) - are common assumptions 
in models of nonlinear pricing. 
The second set of properties characterizes the nature of the network effects - the gross value 
from the network effects is non-decreasing in gross consumption, and the marginal value from an 
increase in gross consumption is (weakly) higher at a higher level of individual consumption, and 
is (weakly) higher for higher types. The source of these network effects are not modeled explicitly. 
The model therefore adopts what Economides (1996b) calls the 'macro' approach. 
The third set of properties assume decreasing absolute risk aversion (which is frequently used to 
characterize the relative curvature of the value functions of different customer types), and marginal 
utility that is concave in type 8 (which is a standard assumption to ensures that the optimal 
contract separates customer types). In one case, a slightly stronger assumption than decreasing 
absolute risk aversion - that the concavity of W with respect to q does not increase with type - is 
necessary5. 
The final set of properties simply state that there is a consumption level beyond which the 
value from additional consumption decreases. It reflects the reality that customers consume a 
finite quantity of any network good, even if the marginal price of additional consumption is zero 
(under a site license, for instance). This is because value from usage is typically bounded by a 
constraint on some related resource - attention or computing power being two common examples - 
and the implicit presence of a substitute use for this resource. Analogously, sometimes the increased 
consumption of the product may necessitate the purchase of additional necessary complementary 
assets (more powerful computer hardware for increased software usage, for in~tance)~.  The quantity 
that maximizes intrinsic value is denoted a(8) - that is, a(8) = P(8,O). 
Each customer of type 8 is assumed to have reservation utility ~ ( 8 )  2 0. The functions F(O), 
W(q, 8, Q), U(q,  O ) ,  and ~ ( 8 )  are common knowledge. Notation used most frequently (some of 
which is defined formally later in the paper) is summarized in Table 2.1. 
Rather than explicitly considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle ensures 
that we can restrict our analysis to direct mechanisms, which specify the pricing schedule as a 
menu of quantity-price pairs (q(t), r(t)) which are incentive-compatible. A simple exposition of 
mechanism design, the revelation principle and its applications to pricing can be found in chapter 
7 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). In particular, section 7.2 describes the revelation principle, and 
section 7.1 discusses a non-linear pricing example. 
2.2. Sequence of events 
The interaction between the monopolist and thcir customers is according to the following sequence: 
1. The monopolist announces their pricing schedulc as a menu of quantity-price pairs q(t),r(t). 
"If W L ( ~ , B , Q )  > 0, then Wm(q,8 ,Q)  > 0 implis that 2(-$:22?)) c 0. 
-- .- L\..-.-, 
'See Sundararajan (2002), Section 4, for more discussion and examples. Also Section 5.2 of the current paper 
discusses relaxing this assumption in the presence of convex costs. 
q. By definition, U(q,O) = W(g,O,O). 
expectations contract. sF(i9) = 
Table 2.1: Summary of key notation 
2. Customers observe q ( t ) , ~ ( t ) ,  and form an expectation about what the gross consumption un- 
der this pricing schedule will be. All customers have access to the same relevant information7, 
and are assumed to form the same expectation QE, which is also k n m  to the monopolist. 
3. Based on their type 0 and the expectation of gross consumption QE, each customer determines 
their optimal individual consumption q(t(O)), where t (0)  = a r g m a x [ ~ ( ~ ( t ) ,  0,  Q ~ )  - ~ ( t ) ] .  If 
t 
the customer gets at least their reservation utility, that is, if: 
then the customer chooses to consume q(t(8)) and pay ~ ( t ( 0 ) ) .  If not, the customer does not 
participate, and purchases zero quantity. 
4. The monopolist gets a payoff of 
B E 8  
where 8 is the set of participating types. Each participating customer gets a payoff of 
where Q A  is the actual realized gross consamption. Each customer that does not participate 
gets a payoff of ~ ( 0 ) .  
2.3. Contracts 
This subsection defines the different contracts, all of which are direct mechanisms, that are used 
in subsequent analysis. To simplify notation, the definition of the following contracts is based on 
the assumption of full participation - that is, that all customers find it optimal to purchase under 
the contract, if the direct mechanism specifies a non-negative allocation for their type. In sections 
3 and 4, inducing full participation is always optimal for the monopolist. 
Q-feasible contracts: Given any expectation of gross consumption Q ,  a Q-feasible contract 
is a menu of of quantity-price pain (qF(t ,  Q ) , r F ( t , Q ) )  which satisfics incentive-compatibility [IC] 
'The customer's unique knowledge of their own type does not affect their expectation of gross consumption, which 
is completely determined by f ( B ) ,  the pricing schedule, and the functions U(q ,  B), W(q, 6' ,Q) ,  and ~(6') (all of which 
are cnmmon knowledge at this stage). 
and individual rationality [IR]: 
Q-optimal contracts: Given any expectation of gross consumption Q, an Q-optimal contract 
(q(8, Q), ~ ( 8 ,  Q)) is a Q-feasible contract that solves the monopolist's profit maximization problem: 
over all (qF(t, Q), rF(t, Q)) that satisfy [IC] and [IR]. 
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts: A optimal fulfilled-expectations wntmct is a 
menu of price-quantity pairs q'(8),.r8(R) such that the contract q(B, Q),T(O,Q) defined by 
is a Q-optimal contract. 
Based on the definitions above, note that if any Q-optimal contract q(O,Q),r(O,Q) satisfies 
fulfilled-ezpectations [FEI for some Q: 
then the contrxt q'(8) = q(B,Q),r*(B) = T(O,Q) is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. 
The solution that the monopolist seeks is a optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. The con- 
ditions for the existence and possible uniqueness of these contracts are described independently in 
each subsection. 
2.4. Entry  deterrence and participation constraints 
The monopolist in the model may face a threat of entry from an entrants, whose product is 
intrinsically a perfect substitute for the monopolist's product. By virtue of being the incumbent, 
the monopolist's product generates positive network value for all customers. The entrant's product, 
on the other hand, is assumed to provide only its intrinsic valve t o  the customers. The fixed cost 
of entry is assumed to be zero. 
The purpose of this subsection is to establish that the problem of pricing to deter entry under 
the threat of costless entry is equivalent to a problem of pricing in the absence of the entry threat, 
but instead with specific type-dependent individual rationality constraints. 
At a gross consumption level Q, the utility of a cust,omer of type 0 who purchases a quantity 
q of the monopolist's product for a payment p is (W(q, 6, Q) - p), a id  the utility of a custonler of 
type 0 who purchases a quantity q of the entrant's product for a payment p is (U(q,0) -p). Given 
a set of prices, and an expectation Q of gross consumption of the monopolist's product, customers 
choose the product and quantity that maximizes their utility. Customers indifferent between the 
monopolist's and the entrant's products are assumed to choose the monopolist's product. 
A complete characterization of the entry game is not provided. Rather, the analysis focuses 
on the characteristics of pricing schedules for the monopolist that successfully deter entry. Since 
the fixed cost of entry is assumed to be zero, these are pricing schedules for the monopolist under 
which any pricing schedule offered by the entrant results in zero profits for the entrant. 
Recall that 
u(9) = argmaxU(q,O), 
9 
and that 
P(6,Q) = arg rnax[U(q, 0) + W(q, 0, Q)1. 
9 
Suppose the entrant offered the constant pricing scheme p(q) = E ,  where E is small. Under this 
pricing scheme, each customer would choose their intrinsic-value maximizing level of consumption 
a(@, and would realize surplus of (U(a(0), 6) - E ) .  If customers of type 0 expected surplus of less 
than (U(a(0),0) - E )  from the monopolist's product, they would buy the entrant's product, and the 
entrant would receive non-zero profits. Therefore, in order to deter entry, the monopolist's pricing 
scheme must provide customers of type 6 with a surplus of at least (U(a(B), 0) - E), for all E > 0. 
 he analysis would not change if there were multiple identical entrants. 
Clearly, this cannot be achieved unless the monopolist's pricing scheme provides customers of type 
0 with surplus of at least U(a(0) ,0) .  Since U(a(0 ) ,0 )  is the maximum surplus that a customer of 
type 0 can get from the entrant's product under any pricing scheme, ensuring that customers get 
this level of surplus is both necessary and sufficient for the monopolist to deter entry. 
As a consequence, when the fixed cost of entry is zero, deterring entry simply imposes a lower 
bound on the surplus each customer type must receive. Analytically, this is identical to the problem 
of choosing a pricing scheme with type-dependent individual rationality constraints (Jullien, 2000). 
In other words, setting o ( 0 )  = U(a(O),O) in equation (2.7) ensures that any Q-feasible contract 
deters entry, and the definitions of all the other contracts in section 2.3 remain the same. 
When faced with a threat of entry, the monopolist's problem is therefore to choose the optimal 
fulfilled-expectations contract, with o ( 0 )  = U(a(0 ) ,  0) .  In the following sections, the monopolist's 
problem is solved both in the absence of an entry threat, as well as in its presence, for both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects. 
2.5. Preliminary results 
The purpose of this subsection is to present two preliminary results used in the subsequent analysis. 
The first result characterizes the optimal contract offered by the monopolist in the absence of 
network effects - that is, when W ( q , 0 , Q )  = U(q,8) for all Q .  This is termed the base m e ,  and is 
used as a benchmark in sections 3 and 4. The second result describes the structure of Q-optima1 
contracts, and demonstrates their uniqueness. 
In the base case, since there are no network effects, fulfilled-expectations do not play a role. 
Lemma 1. When W(q, 0, Q )  = U(q,  0 ) ,  the monopolist offers the contract qO(0), rO(0)  which sat- 
isfies the following conditions for all 8: 
This contract defined by (2.13) and (2.14) is unique. Moreover, for all 0 such that qO(0) > 0,  it 
satisfies qY(0) > 0, r f (0)  > 0. 
The proof of this result is omitted. The reader is referred to chapter 2 of Salani6 (1997) for a 
simple exposition, or to Maskin and Riley (1984) for more details. A complete proof based on a 
model formulation similar to that of this paper is also available in Sundararajan (2002). 
Lemma 2. 1 f ~ ( 8 )  = 0, for every expectation of consumption Q, theQ-optimal contract q(8, Q), ~ ( 8 ,  Q) 
is unique, and is defined by the following conditions: 
and 
Unless otherwise specified, proofs of all results are available in Appendix A. 
3. Homogeneous network effects 
This section analyzes network effects that depend on just gross consumption, and discusses some 
properties of consumption, pricing and welfare under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. 
The value function W(q, 8,Q) is assumed to be linearly separable in intrinsic value and network 
value, and to take the following form 
From the definition of intrinsic value U(q,8), (3.1) implies that w(0) = 0. 
3.1. P u r e  monopoly pricing 
In the absence of an entry threat (which is referred to as pure monopoly, to distinguish it from 
the subsequent entry-deterring monopoly), the following proposition establishes that the unique 
solution to the monopolist's problem is very similar to that of the base case: 
Proposition 1. If W(q, 8, Q) = U(q,8) + w(Q), then the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract 
takes the form: 
I I 
4*(9,) s'fe,) 
Figure 3.1: Illustrates the optimal consumption of two types and 02 (01 < 02) with homogeneous 
network effects under pure monopoly. First-order necessary conditions are met for each type at 
1-F e the intersection of the U1(q,6') and the ~~~(~,0)-jisfZ curves. AS a consequence, q*(O) = ~O(O). 
ii 
where qO(0) and .r0(6') are specified in (2.13) and (2.141, and Q0 = SqO(0) f(0)de. A contract of 
a 
- 
this form exists and is unique for any function w(Q). 
Proposition 1 shows that when the network value function depends on just gross consumption, 
the monopolist finds it optimal to induce levels of consumption from each customer type that 
are identical to those in the absence of network effects, and to simply increase the total price 
charged to every type by an amount equal to the network value. The intuition behind this result 
is straightforward. For any common expectation Q of gross consumption, the value functions of all 
customer types are shifted up by the same constant amount w(Q). Since there is no change in the 
marginal properties of the utility functions, the monopolist's optimal allocation q8(0) remains the 
same for all types. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
It is evident from (3.3) that the monopolist captures all of the increase in surplus from the 
network effects. In addition, ci~st,nmer surplus does not change for any customer type relative to 
the base case. This outcome changes substantially when there is an entry threat, as established in 
the following subsection. 
Base case I Optimal contract: I q0(8) = 28; ~ ' ( 8 )  = 28 - 0' 
P u r e  monopoly I Q-optimal contract: I q(8,Q) = 28; r(8,Q) = 20 - 8' + W& 
Entry-deterring monopoly I Q-optimal contract: I q ( 8 , Q ) = e + l ; r ( e , Q )  =wQ I 
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: 
Surplus functions: 
qt(8) = 28; rL(8) = 28 - 8' + w 
~ ' ( 8 )  = 8'; s~(6') = 38' 
I 
Table 3.1: Optimal contracts and surplus e ~ p r ~ w i o n s  from the example with homogeneous network 
effects 
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: 
I 
3.2. Entry-deterring monopoly pricing 
) w  q'(8) = 8+ 1; T*(%) = ?- 2 
Surplus functions: 
This subsection specifies the optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts in the presence of an entry 
threat that is successfully deterred. The main result establishes that the unique solution to the 
monopolist's problem in this case is to specify a quantity-independent (fixed-fee) pricing schedule: 
~ ' ( 8 )  = (8 + 1)' ; ~ ~ ( 8 )  = 3(8 + 1)' 2 7 
Proposition 2. If W(q,O,Q) = U(q,8) + w(Q), then the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract 
that deters entry takes the form: 
s 
where Q* = Sa(0)  f(0)dO. A contract of this form exists and is unique for any network value 
B 
function w(Q). 
Proposition 2 establishes that when network effects depend on just gross consumption, the 
optimal entry-deterring pricing scheme results in all customers choosing the level of consumption 
that maximizes total surplusg. Intuitively, a contract that separates any subset of types (in order 
to pricodiscriminate) would need to induce consumption levels that are strictly lower than a(8) 
O~ote that since W,(q, 0 ,  Q) = 0 in this caw, B(0, Q) = a(6) .  
<'c,,,cv I;>, l),~,I:,l I cL>!l<>nl\ IR<>C?,!<I, 
(a) Optimal consumption across types 
Entry-deterring monopoly 
2 
I I 
0 0-1 
(b) Total price across types 
(c) Customer surplus across types (d) Relative customer surplus across types 
Figure 3.2: Illustrate the optimal fulfilled-expectation contracts and corresponding customer surplus 
and relative surplus, in the example when network effects are homogeneous across types. 
for all but the highest type in this subset. This would result in a strict decrease in profits for 
the monopolist, since they would have to share some portion of the network value w(Q") with 
the customers in this subset in order to satisfy [IR] and ensure that customer surplus is at least 
U(a(O),O).  The accompanying reduction in Q" accentuates the reduction in monopoly profits 
further. As a consequence, it is strictly profit-reducing to price-discriminate, and the monopolist 
offers the fixed-fee that maximizes profits. 
3.3. Example 
An example is analyzed to illustrate the results of Propositions 1 and 2 further, and to cxamine 
how network effects and the threat of entry changes the surplus distribution across customers. 
In order to perform the latter analysis, define the cwtomer surplw function as: 
~ ' (0 )  is the surplus that customers of type 0 get under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. 
Also, define the surplus distribution function sp(0) as: 
~ ~ ( 0 )  measures how is the total customer surplus (that is, the total value not captured by the 
monopolist) is distributed across the different customer types. It enables one to examine how 
changes in network effects affect the relative levels of surplus that different customer types get. 
The example uses a simple quadratic value function, and uniformly distributed customer types. 
The value function is assumed to take the following form: 
and customer types are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, which implies that 
f(0) = 1 and F(0) = 0. 
The contracts and surplus values that result from applying Propositions 1 and 2, and equations 
(3.6) and (3.7) are sumrr~arized in Table 3.1. Under pure n~onopoly, consister~t with Proposition 1, 
consumption is unaffected by the network effects, and prices increase by an amount equal to the 
network value. Under entry deterring monopoly, individual consumption increases for all customers, 
and a fixed fee equal to the network value is charged to each customer. 
Figure 3.2 (a) and (b) illustrate how q'(0) and ~ ~ ( 0 )  vary with type. By substituting q8(6') into 
~ + ( 0 ) ,  one can derive the explicit pricing function p(q) = q - $, which is strictly concave, which in 
turn implies a progressively increasing quantity discount. 
Under entry-deterring monopoly, prices increase for a subset of lower types. However, so does 
customer surplus, as indicated in Figure 3.2 (c). Mhermore,  Figure 3.2 (d) shows that when 
there is a threat of entry, the relative distribution of surplus across different customer types is 
less skewed in favor of highcr-usagc customers. This is despite the incrense in total pricc for thc 
lower-usage customers, relative to the higher-usage customers. These results are discussed further 
in Section 5. 
4. Heterogeneous network effects 
This section models network effects that depend on both gross consumption and individual con- 
sumption. Both pure monopoly and entry-deterring monopoly are analyzed. The value function 
W(q,B,  Q )  is assumed to be linearly separable in intrinsic value and network value, and to take the 
following form 
W ( q ,  8, Q )  = U(q,  8 )  + qw(Q). 
4.1. Pure monopoly pricing 
In the absence of an entry threat, the following proposition establishes the main characteristics of 
the optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts: 
Proposition 3. (a) If W ( q ,  8, Q )  = U(q, 8 )  + qw(Q), then any optimal fulfilled-expectations con- 
tract satisfies the following conditions: 
and 
B 
where &* = /'q*(B) f ( 8 ) d .  
e 
-
(b) If w(Q)  has a finite upper bound 25, then an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract always 
exists. In addition, if w l ( Q )  < - ~ ~ ~ ( q , g )  for all Q and q, then (4.1) and (4.2) specify the unique 
optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. 
(c)For all 8, qa(8) > q0(8), and r'(8) > r0(8) 
Sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibrium are fairly 
mild - all that is required is that the marginal benefit from the network effects w ( Q )  be bounded. 
The condition for uniqueness requires that in general, marginal network value not grow too fast 
relative to marginal intrinsic value. However, even if the solution is not unique, this is not unduly 
troubling, since multiple possible equilibrium outcomes are not uncommon in models of network 
goods. The monopolist simply needs to pick the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract that provides 
I-F(e2) [Jlz(q>ez)- 
I 
qOfeI q1{e1) q0(e2) q"(e2) 
Figure 4.1: Illustrates the optimal consumption of two types B1 and 02 (81 < 82) with heterqqeneow 
network effects under pure monopoly. The marginal value curves Wl(q,8, Q) are higher than the 
corresponding Ul(q, 8) curves, by a constant amount w (Q). This results in a strict increase in 
consumption for all types, relative to the base case. 
the highest profits10. It is important to note that the results in part (c) of the proposition (and 
those in Proposition 5) do not rely on uniqueness. 
The network effects shift the customer value functions up by qw(Q*) for all types. Since this 
shift is proportionate to individual consumption, it results in optimal quantities that are different 
from those of the base case. Part (c) of the proposition establishes that this is a strict increase 
for all types, and is illustrated in Figure 4.1, for two candidate types. Correspondingly, prices also 
go up for all customers. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss the changes in the division of total surplus 
further. 
4.2. Entry deterring monopoly pricing 
The analysis of Proposition 3 is now extended to the case where a threat of entry is successfully 
deterred. Some new notation is introduced (though mostly in the proof of Proposition 4, which is 
in the appendix). 
Let qm(8,Q) denote the Q-optimal contract under pure monopoly. Applying Lemma 2 ,  this 
- 
"FLeeall that customer expectations are formed after the contract is specified. 
allocation is defined for each O by the necessary conditions 
and is unique for a fixed value of Q. Also, from Proposition 3, we know that there is an optimal 
fulfilled-expectations equilibrium - that is, there is a value of gross consumption such that 
The following proposition establishes that the monopolist's pricing scheme results in individual 
consumption that is either of the form qm(O, Q ) ,  or that maximizes intrinsic value for the customer: 
Proposition 4. Suppose W(q,  0, Q)  = U(q, 8) + qw(Q). Assume that the uniquenes condition 
wl(Q) < -Ull(q,8) from Proposition 3 b met. Define: 
(a) If Q" I Qm, then the unique optimal fuE11ed-expectations contract is: 
(b) If QQ > Qm, then the unique optimal fulfilled-expectations contract is: 
for 8 5 a ( @ ) ,  and 
for 8 2 6(Q"), where Q" is the unique solution to: 
Proposition 4 establishes that the same conditions that ensure uniqueness of the optimal fulfilled- 
expectations contract in the absence of an entry threat are sufficient to ensure uniqueness under the 
threat of entry. It also establishes that the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract that deters entry 
can be elegantly characterized using a combination of Q-optimal contracts under pure monopoly, 
and the contract that implements allocations of a(8) for each type 0. 
If qn'(@,Qm) > a(@) for the lowest type @, an immediate corollary of the proposition is that 
the presence of the entry threat does not change the individual consumption of any of the types 
(since qm(@,Qm) > a(@) implies that Q" < Qm). This is likely to happen when the marginal 
network value w(Q) is high relative to marginal intrinsic value, or equivalently, if network effects 
are substantial for all types,. This is illustrated further in section 4.4. 
Under the conditions of part (b) of the proposition, there are substantial changes in individual 
consumption (relative to pure monopoly). However, 6(Q") is always an interior point of [6J,8]. This 
implies that the larger increases in individual consumption (to the level a(0) which maximizes 
intrinsic value) will always be for a subset of 'lower' types, and that there will always be a subset 
of higher types whose individual consumption is still of the form qm(B,Q*). It is easily shown 
that under part (b) of the proposition, Q* > Qm, which implies that consumption increases for all 
customer types (but more substantially for the lower subset). 
4.3. Welfare analysis 
This subsection characterizes how the monopolist and its customers share the surplus generated by 
the network effects under pure monopoly, and also discusses surplus division under entry-deterring 
monopoly. 
Suppose qa(8), ~ ' ( 8 )  is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract for some value function W(q, 9, Q), 
- 
0 
with realized gross consumption Q" = J'q*(O) f(0)dO. Relative to the base case, the net change in 
0 
-
total sulplvs as a consequence of the network effects is therefore: 
The direct change in surplus from a customer of type 0 as a consequence of the network effects is 
defined aq: 
sn(@) = w(qO(0), 0, QO) - v($(0),@), (4.15) 
s 
where Q0 = JqO(0) f(@)d0. Similarly, define the indzrect change in sulplvs from a customer of 
a 
type 0 as a consequence of the network effects as 
sn(0) measures the change in surplus as a consequence of having the increase in value from the 
network effects, without accounting for any of the changes in consumption. sq(0)  measures the 
changes in surplus that arise indirectly as a consequence of the changes in consumption (both 
individual and gross) that the network effects induce. The total change in surplus across all types, 
- 
e 
as specified in (4.14), can now be equivalently expressed as J[sn(8) + s'J(0)l f (0)d0. 
e 
-
Proposition 5. Under pure monopoly, the monopolist always captures all of the direct increase 
in surplus, and shares some of the indirect increase in surplus with the customers. That is: 
and 
s - - e 
/~*(0)f (0)& - / T ~ ( Q ) I ( ~ ) ~ @  c ~ ( 0 )  + sq(0)if(O)dO, 
e - - e
1 - e 
where sn(0) and s'J(8) are as defined in (4.1 5) and (4.1 6). 
While proved for heterogeneous network effects, this result applies trivially to homogeneous net- 
work effects, since under Proposition 1, there is no indirect increme in surplus, and the monopolist 
captures all the direct surplus increase. Proposition 5 establishes that with heterogeneous network 
effects, the monopolist continues to get all the direct increase in surplus from the network effects, 
<'c,,,cv I;>, l),~,l:,l I c,>,,<>,,,\ lR<>~?,,<l, 
Base case I Optimal contract: I qO(0) = 28; ~ ' ( 8 )  = 28 - 8" 
Pure monopoly 
w 2 + w Q )  Q-optimal contract: l q ( 8 , ~ ) = 2 8 + ~ ~ . ~ ( 8 , ~ ) = 2 e - ~ ' +  O' ,
I 
Table 4.1: Optimal contracts and surplus in the ezample with heterogeneous network effects, under 
pure monopoly 
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: 
I 
and that any increase in customer surplus are driven by increases in consumption. 
Under entry-deterring monopoly, the division of direct and indirect increa- in surplus is less 
relevant - all customers of type 8 get surplus at least equal to U(a(8 ) ,8 ) ,  which implies that they 
capture all of the intrinsic value that they create. Moreover, the customer types whose optimal 
consumption is of the form qm(8, p) (that is, all customers under part (a), and the higher subset 
under part (b) of Proposition 4)  capture a fraction of the network value that they create. Since 
U(a(O),O) > U(q*(B),B) for q"(8) > ( ~ ( e ) ,  the monopolist needs to give up network value to the 
customer if they raise consumption beyond a(0 ) .  The negative terms in square brackets at the end 
of equations (4.8) and (4.12) represent the surplus type 8 gets beyond U(a(B),B),  which implies 
that these customers are capturing a fraction over and above this reservation level. 
w w(2 - W )  q8(8) = 28 + - , T*(@)  = 2 8 - 0 ~ +  1 - w  2(1 - w)2 
Surplus functions: 
4.4. Example 
w 6 ( 1 - w  + w )  
r ( 8 )  = s(8 + -), ~ F ( Q )  = '(' + 2 1 - w  
The example presented in Section 3.3 is extended to incorporate network effects that depend on 
individual consumption as well as on gross consumption. The value function is assumed to take 
the following form: 
1 
W ( q ,  8, Q) = (8 + 1)q - p2 + WQQ, 
and as before, customer types are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The 
definitions of the surplus functions ~ ' ( 8 )  and SF(@ are in Section 3.3. 
Since Ull (q ,8)  = -1, the uniqueness condition in Propositions 3 and 4 reduces to w < 1. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarizes the solutions for the optimal contracts and surplus functions under 
this condition. As expected from Proposition 3, both quantities and prices increase under pure 
Entry-deterring monopoly 
Intermediate variables: I Q  a _ _ .  - : . Q  m - .  - , ~ w , 8 ( ~ ) = 1 - ~ ~  
When w 2 4 
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: 
I 
W q'(8) = 28 + - ,~ ' ( 8 )  = 1 - ( 1  - 8)2 1 - w  2(1-  w)2 
Surplus functions: 
When w 5 
Note: When w 5 i, Q' = 1-F ui and B(Q') = w-I+- w 
W 
~ ~ ( 8 )  = 0(8+ -) + I, ~ ~ ( 8 )  = 3((2f12+1)(1-w)+26'w) 1 - w  5-2w 
Optimal fulfilled-expectations contract: 
I 
Table 4.2: Optimal contracts and surplus expressions in the example with heterogeneous network 
effects, under entry-deterring monopoly 
8 5 B ( Q ' ) :  q'(0) = 0 + 1, ~ * ( 8 )  = wQ*(l + 0)  
8 2 8 ( ~ ' ) :  q'(8) = 28+wQ', ~ ~ ( 8 )  = 2wQ' - ( 1  - 8)2 
Surplus functions: 
monopoly, relative to the bosc case. 
Figure 4.2 (a) and (b) illustrate the optimal contract for two different values of marginal network 
value w.  In addition, by substituting q*(8) into re(@),  one can obtain the explicit pricing function: 
6 5 a (@) :  s'(8) = (1 + 0)" 3(1+ 0)' 2 SF(') = 7 + (wQ*)3 
The optimal pricing function is therefore a nonlinear two-part taviff, with a fixed component that 
increases with the marginal network value w ,  and a strictly concave variable portion - again, 
implying a quantity discount that is progressively increasing. Moreover, differentiating (4.20) with 
respect to q indicates that pl.(q) = & - z, which is strictly increasing in w for w < 1. As a 
consequence, absolute prices at any level of consumption always increase with w .  
As shown in Figure 4.2 (c), an increase in w increases customer surplus for all customer types. 
What is particularly interesting is that as w increases, the relative distribution of surplus across 
customer types is less convex. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (d), and indicates that at higher 
levels of network effects, surplus is distributed more evenly across customers of different types. This 
is a socially favorable result, because it suggests higher distributional equity of the value created, 
<'c,,,cv I;>, l),~,l:,l I c,>,,<>,,,\ lR<>~?,,<l, 
(a) Optimal consumption across types (b) Total price across types 
3 - .... .. . . .... .. . . . ... . . . ... . ... ... .-.  ... ... ... 
Lower value of w 
0 t ' - I  
(c) Customer surplus across types (d) Relative customer surplus across types 
Figure 4.2: Illustrates the optimal fulfilled-expectation contracts and corresponding customer sur- 
plus and relative surplus for purr monopoly, in the example when network effects are heterogeneous 
across types. In each figure, the dotted curve represents the base case (when network value is zero). 
across customers who differ in their usage levels. 
Under entry-deterring monopoly, equating the expressions for Qa and Qm indicate that part 
(a) of Proposition is applicable for w 2 4, and part (b) applies for w 5 4. This confirms that the 
entry threat induces changes in total surplus (via an induced change in optimal consumption) for 
lower levels of network effects, but not at higher levels. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.3 (a), as w increases, optimal consumption is raised (relative to the 
corresponding levels under pure monopoly) for an increasingly smaller fraction of customer types, 
and when w 2 4, consumption is unaltered for all types (though total prices reduce by a fixed 
amount across all types). 
At fairly low values of w, total price may increase for a subset of lower types. This is because 
(a) Optimal consumption across types (b) Total price across types 
(c) Relative customer surplus across types (lower w) (d) Relative customer surplus across types (higher w: 
Figure 4.3: Illustrates the optimal fulfilled-expectation contracts and corresponding relative c u s  
tomer surplus for entry-deterring monopoly, in the example when network effects are 11er;erogeneous. 
In each figure, the dotted curves represent the corresponding v a l u ~  in the case of pum monopoly. 
the changes in consumption are substantial for these lower customer types, relative to the case of 
pure monopoly. Average prices (per unit of consumption) always decrease with a threat of entry, 
across all types. Clearly, customer surplus also increases, across all types. 
Figure 4.3 (c) and (d) further highlight the socially desirable effect of a threat of entry that 
was noted in section 3.3 - the flattening of the relative distribution of surplus across types. This 
accentuates the increased distributional equity from increasing network effects that was illustrated 
in Figure 4.2(d). The former effect is more pronounced when network effects are lower. This 
is not surprising, since the latter effect is more pronounced when network effects are higher (and 
as a consequence, there is already less inequity across customers to begin with). This result has 
interesting policy implications, which are discussed further in Section 5. 
5. Discussion 
A number of new results relating to the pricing of network goods have been derived in Sections 3 
and 4. This section discusses some of these results, examines some of the model's assumptions, and 
concludes with an outline of open questions raised by the analysis. 
5.1. Discussion of results 
Managers in technology industries with network effects face especially difficult pricing problems. 
Their challenges include setting complex pricing schedules for variable quantity purchases, designing 
optimal quantity discounts, taking into account hcterogeneity in network value across different 
customers, and also incorporating the reality that entry threats and 'comparables' from potential 
competitors play an important role in limiting the amount customers can be charged. Network 
effects pose an additional unique challenge, since there is the trade-off between designing prices 
that increase value from higher gross consumption, and prices that enables the seller to capture as 
much of this value as possible. 
This paper provide a set of theoretical results, based on a model which explicitly captures these 
issues, and can therefore form a robust basis for designing pricing policy for products of this kind. In 
addition, many empirical papers on network externalities (for instance, Gandal, 1995, Brynjolfsson 
and Kemerer, 1996, Forman, 2001) have studied technology markets - databases, spreadsheets, 
networking equipment - in which sellers with monopoly power routinely offer nonlinear pricing 
schedules, sell variable quantities to customers, and price to deter entry. The results of this paper 
could form a stronger theory base for Future empirical work which aims to estimate the extent and 
implications of network effects in such markets. 
When network effects do not vary across customers: Proposition 1 establishes that an increase 
in network effects induces no change in consumption, and that all surplus From the network effects 
is appropriated by the monopolist. A threat of entry changes pricing substantially - a fixed fee 
is offered to all customer types, and the outcome is socially optimal. While the specification of 
network effects in section 3 is simple, it would apply to industries in which the primary network 
value stems from a common fixed-cost reduction - for instance, the cost of finding the appropriate 
hosting infrastructure, or qualified technical support. These results also indicate that if competing 
products are anything but perfectly compatible, any oligopoly outcome will be socially inferior 
to the entry-deterring monopoly outcome. In other words, from a policy perspective, ensuring a 
credible t h m t  of entry is more socially eficient than actually inducing entry. 
When the value realized from network effects varies with individual consumption, Proposition 
3 establishes a strict increase in individual consumption across all customer types. In any model of 
nonlinear pricing, there is always a trade-off between value creation and price discrimination, and 
the consumption of lower customer types is limited by the monopolist' desire to capture as much 
surplus as possible. The issue of value creation is accentrlated further when there are network effects, 
since increases in consumption from any subset of customer types increases the value created by all 
ci~stomer types. The trade-off still exists, though, and while pricing is redesigned to induce usage 
increases from both lower and higher customer types, the lower-usage customers still consume at a 
socially inefficient level. However, the relative distribution of surplus improves for lower custo~ner 
types, implying that the network effects benefit lower-usage customers disproportionately, even 
though the higher-usage customers contribute relatively more to their actual magnitude. 
Furthermore, when network value depends on individual consumption as well as gross con- 
sumption, the effects of an entry threat are less pronounced that those established by Proposition 
2. In fact, as shown in Proposition 4(a), the threat of entry may have no effect on consumption or 
surplus, and may merely result in a price change that redistributes surplus between the monopolist 
and its customers. Note that this occurs even when entry is not blockaded. This outcome is most 
likely when, relative to marginal intrinsic value, marginal network value is fairly high across all 
customers, as illustrated further by the example in Section 4.4. 
The examples studied in sections 3.3 and 4.4 are particularly instructive in the pricing schedules 
they prescribe for the seller. Quantity discounts are always optimal, and heterogeneous network 
effects lead to the optimality of a two-part nonlinear pricing schedule. Many IT products have high 
fixed costs, and optimal price discrimination is crucial for innovative product lines to be viablc, 
even for a seller with substantial market power. These results provide important pricing policy 
guidelines for IT companies that face these tariff design challenges. 
These examples also highlight the effect of network effects and entry deterrence on the relative 
distribution of surplus across participating customers. Regulatory agencies often consider imple- 
menting policy that affects not just total surplus, but the equity of surplus distribution across 
customers. For instance, the attention received by the issue of the 'digital divide' illustrates this 
potential objective clearly. Towards this end, this paper establishes that even if creating a credible 
threat of entry does not increase total surplus, it will reduce the inequity in surplus division across 
the different customers who generate the surplus through their consumption. In addition, there 
will always be accompanying transfer of surplus to all customers. While the outcome never max- 
imizes total surplus, it is still likely that it is more efficient than an oligopoly with incompatible 
products. 
5.2. Discussion of assumptions 
The sequence of events specified in section 2.3 assumes that all customers have identical expectations 
of gross consumption. Under the assumption of rational participants, this is not restrictive - 
everyone has access to all the information needed to compute the expected consumption, and once 
the monopolist has specified prices, there is no residual uncertainty about demand. Clearly, in 
equilibrium, all customers must have the same expectation (the correct one) 
However, compared to standard models of nonlinear pricing, this paper places a higher compu- 
tational burden on customers. Each customer has to know F(B), compute the optimal consumption 
(not just for the~nselw, but for all customer types), and them calculate the gross consumption. It 
may be likely that customers of network goods cannot actually compute the true gross consumption 
immediately, due to a lack of information, or due to bounds on information processing capability. 
There may be a multi-period adjustment process, in which customers iteratively make a series of 
guesses which converge to the fulfilled-expectations equilibrium outcome. Alternately, customers 
may learn the distribution of types from the pricing schedule. Formalizing these notions remains 
(very early-stage) work in progress. 
The assumption that W(q,B,Q) has a finite maximum q for all 0 and Q is non-standard. 
However, given that marginal costs are zero in the model, it is necessary in order to get a bounded 
solution. It is also a reflection of reality - that customers do stop using zero marginal price products 
at a finite level, typically due to the presence of resource constraints, and substitute uses for shared 
resources, as discussed in Section 2.1. 
In addition, slightly modified versions of all of the results in this paper continue to hold under 
the assumption of unbounded value functions and positivc convcx costs. Consider, for instance, 
a (standard) specification in which customer utility is ~ ( q ,  0, Q), *(q, 0,Q) > 0 for all q (and 
w(rg,B, Q) has the other curvature properties attributed to the customer value function in this 
paper). In addition, suppose the provision of quantity q to each customer has a positive cost c(q), 
where cl(q) > 0, cI1(q) > 0. If one defined the total surplus function as: 
then W(q, 9,Q) would have the same properties as it does in this model. More importantly, all 
the expressions for q*(8) derived in the model would continue to be valid, and so would all the 
expressions for ~ ' ( 8 ) ~  if it is treated as the optimal markup rather than the optimal price. In other 
words, the optimal contracts would be qW(8), (~ ' (8)  + c(qf(8))), with the same expressions for q'(8) 
and ~ ~ ( 9 )  as derived in sections 3 and 4. Therefore, this paper's results are also applicable for 
technology products that display positive network effects, but which have non-zero marginal costs 
(networking equipment or handheld computers, for instance) 
Some of the paper's results have specified conditions on the marginal network value that are 
necessary to guarantee uniqueness. However, none of the properties of the contracts derived in 
Propositions 1 through 3 depend on uniqueness, and neither do the results of Proposition 5. If 
there are multiple optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibria, all the monopolist needs to do is choose 
the one with the highest profits. Proposition 4 relies on uniqueness, though a slightly modified 
version holds if one assumes that the monopolist always chooses the highest-profit contract. 
5.3. Concluding remarks 
The value from network effects in this model vary wross types due to the customers' varying 
individual consumption needs. As formulated, the model does not yet admit differing network 
value across different types at the same level of individual consumption. A model that incorporates 
this is work-in-progress. Early results suggest that for sufficiently heterogeneous marginal network 
value, network effects may harm low-usage customers. Related work-in-progress involves a setup 
where network value is of the form wF(Q) + qwY(Q). 
A more general characterization might be to model the network good as a multiproduct bundle, 
and characterize customers using a twwdimensional type vector, drawing on Armstrong (1996) 
and Rachet and Chone (1998). This would require substantial further analysis, and represents an 
interesting direction for future research. 
Industries in which products display network effects are often natural monopolies, especially 
when competing products are incompatible and marginal costs are near-zero. Moreover, entry- 
deterrence appears to play a significant role in practice (as illustrated by the Microsoft antitrust 
case). The analysis of entry-deterring monopoly is therefore likely to be very important for these 
industries. In light of the results obtained in this paper, a natural (and open) question that arises 
is how non-zero entry costs affects outcomes. Clearly, monopoly profits will increase, and entry 
deterrence will still be an optimal strategy - however, it is likely that profits will increase by less 
than the entry cost. 
Finally, the analysis of entry dctcrrence suggests the feasibility of solving a general model of 
nonlinear pricing for competing network goods. If customers expect the competing products to have 
different levels of gross consumption, they would view them as vertically differentiated products, as 
in Stole (1995), which would admit pricing other than the zero-markup contracts in Mandy (1992). 
Similar issues have been analyzed in a model of coalition formation by Economides and Flyer (1998). 
Price reductions that increase network effects would become 'quality' investments, 'and the issue of 
how competitive intensity is affected by these investments, as highlighted by Banker, Khosla and 
Sinha (1998), becomes relevant, especially since Section 4.2 suggests that in a general model, the 
equilibrium profits of the smaller network are likely to be zero. Recent results from Rochet and 
Stole (2001) indicate the feasibility of modeling mixed-strategy equilibria, and I hope to address 
some of these questions in the near future. 
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